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THE TOOLS OF POLITICAL DISSENT: 
A FIRST AMENDMENT GUIDE TO  
GUN REGISTRIES 
Thomas E. Kadri* 
INTRODUCTION 
On December 23, 2012, a newspaper in upstate New York published a 
provocative map.1 On it appeared the names and addresses of thousands of 
gun owners in nearby counties, all precisely pinpointed for the world to 
browse. The source of this information: publicly available data drawn from 
the state’s gun registry. Legislators were quick to respond. Within a month, a 
new law offered gun owners the chance to permanently remove their 
identities from the registry with a simple call to their county clerk. 
The map raised interesting questions about broadcasting personal 
information, but a more fundamental question remains: Are these gun 
registries even constitutional? The mass “exposure” of gun owners—used as 
a form of public shaming—is particularly troubling because it would have 
been impossible without the government’s registration requirement. The 
map confirmed a fear held by many opponents of registries: compilation of 
personal information could lead to reprisals, either by the media or through 
the state itself. This, they claim, implicates their Second Amendment rights. 
In states that insist on registration, opponents have had to mold 
constitutional arguments to challenge registries in the courts. One such 
argument grows from the First Amendment. Gun ownership, like speech, is 
a tool of political dissent.2 Both guns and speech empower individuals to 
resist governmental oppression, at least in theory. Yet both become blunt 
tools if the government imposes registration requirements that numb the 
right. So, the argument goes, these tools of political dissent must remain 
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thankful for Professor Mathias Reimann’s wise guidance, and for Joel Pratt’s brilliant editing 
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 1. See generally Christine Haughney, Legislature Restricts Access to Permit Data, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 16, 2013, at A15, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/16/nyregion/new-
yorks-new-gun-law-restricts-public-access-to-permit-data.html. 
 2. David Kopel, Trust the People: The Case Against Gun Control, 109 POL’Y ANALYSIS 
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unregistered if they are to provide the robust protection against tyranny that 
the Framers sought. 
This Essay argues that the First Amendment can be a powerful analogue 
in Second Amendment challenges to gun registries. Part I explores the 
notion of guns as a tool of political dissent through the lens of history. Part II 
examines three First Amendment cases that could shape the analogue to 
challenge gun registries. Finally, Part III uses these three decisions to sketch 
out a blueprint that legislators and litigants can use to analyze gun registries. 
I. A TOOL OF POLITICAL DISSENT 
“A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, 
the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.”3 Upon 
this constitutional canvas, the Supreme Court in District of Columbia v. 
Heller concluded that the right was “necessary” because it helped make 
citizens “better able to resist tyranny.”4 
Two of the Framers—James Madison and Alexander Hamilton—
championed the vision of guns as a tool of political dissent. Chiefly, both saw 
an armed populace as an essential deterrent to tyrannical government. 
Madison focused on a despotic federal government: if such a government 
ever “accumulate[d] a military force for the projects of ambition,” the people 
“would be able to repel the danger.”5 Americans would have “the advantage 
of being armed” so as to form “a barrier against the enterprises of 
ambition.”6 For his part, Hamilton feared that either a state or the federal 
government could become tyrannical. “If the representatives of the people 
betray their constituents,” he warned, “there is then no resource left but in 
the exertion of that original right of self-defense which is paramount to all 
positive forms of government . . . . The citizens must rush tumultuously to 
arms, without concert, without system, without resource; except in their 
courage and despair.”7 
Others have framed the Second Amendment as the ultimate right—the 
protector of all others. Justice Story, for one, remarked that “the right of the 
citizens to keep and bear arms has justly been considered, as the palladium 
of the liberties of a republic.”8 On this view, guns are not merely a tool of 
political dissent but the very foundation of every individual right that the 
 
 3. U.S. CONST. amend. II (emphasis added). 
 4. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 598 (2008). 
 5. THE FEDERALIST NO. 46 (James Madison) (1788). 
 6. Id. 
 7. THE FEDERALIST NO. 28 (Alexander Hamilton) (1787). 
 8. 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 
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Constitution guarantees. Although that claim is perhaps hyperbolic, a 
moderate iteration endures: “leaving legislatures free to engage in whimsical 
infringements on fundamental rights prepares the way for more serious 
assaults on individual liberty.”9 Registries thus offend the Second 
Amendment’s core because, by stifling anonymous gun ownership, two 
forces blunt the use of guns as tools of political dissent: first, citizens may be 
deterred from acquiring firearms for fear that they will be targeted as a name 
on the government’s registration list; and second, registries make it easier for 
a tyrant to locate and seize the citizens’ guns. 
These fears may seem farcical—merely the ranting of “gun nuts” who 
fan fake flames to protect their precious firearms. But opponents of registries 
are quick to invoke history as their friend. One oft-cited example of a mass-
confiscation regime is the firearm registry in Nazi Germany. Hitler’s 
registration laws enabled authorities to identify gun owners quickly and 
easily, to disarm en masse, and to perpetrate wicked deeds without fear of 
retaliation. 
The civil rights movement also stars in the antiregistry storyline. Jim 
Crow laws sought to disarm former slaves and their descendants through 
finicky registration requirements. Later, bands of civil rights activists often 
relied on guns to guard their streets and fend off vigilantism. And California 
took concerted measures to disarm the Black Panthers after the group 
protested by invading the statehouse in 1967. Guns served as a buffer against 
state tyranny for those most vocal in their dissent against racist laws, 
although the states often fought back. 
 These historical bedrocks have retained their rhetorical resonance today. 
Charlton Heston, the former president of the National Rifle Association, 
often parroted the slogan: “First comes registration, then confiscation.”10 
Some groups have taken more dramatic steps to propel their message; Jews 
for the Preservation of Firearms Ownership, for example, boasts this 
 
 
 9. Nelson Lund, The Past and Future of the Individual’s Right to Arms, 31 GA. L. REV. 
1, 71 (1996). 
 10. No Freedom Without Right to Own Guns, Actor Charlton Heston Says, CANADIAN 
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poster as a bestseller11: 
 
 
The comparisons to this embodiment of evil are overblown and 
disingenuous, but they have been a potent rallying cry for those seeking to 
undermine registration. Ultimately, a more measured point suffices: 
opponents view registries as a system to enable “any rogue government—
aided by its ultrahigh-speed, ultrahigh-storage-capacity computers—to 
quickly confiscate the people’s firearms”12 and quash resistance. That system 
is antithetical to one of careful Madisonian balances: it stands in fierce 
contrast to the notion of guns as tools of political dissent and a check on 
tyranny. 
II. REGISTRIES AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
When the Supreme Court unveiled its Second Amendment tabula rasa, 
lower courts scrambled to carve the contours of the right to keep and bear 
arms. Litigants and commentators have increasingly looked to free-speech 
jurisprudence when reading the tea leaves left by Heller.13 Although some 
have reasonably questioned the wisdom of blindly blending doctrines, the 
analogy between the First and Second Amendments does carry logical force. 
Both amendments thrive on proud exceptionalism: although other 
nations certainly protect speech and gun rights, the American tradition does 
 
 11. Raise Your Right Hand Poster, JPFO ONLINE STORE, available at 
http://shop.jpfo.org/cart.php?m=product_detail&p=78 (last visited Feb. 16, 2014). 
 12. GREGG LEE CARTER, GUNS IN AMERICAN SOCIETY 362 (2012). 
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so in a way that is scarcely matched, if at all. Both feature prominently in 
America’s political and legal culture and in its national identity. Both sit atop 
the Bill of Rights—the first two amendments that added individual liberties 
to the Constitution’s structural skeleton. Both secure rights that can cause 
harm but that we nonetheless accept. And crucially, both could plausibly be 
read as furnishing unlimited rights, but the Supreme Court has shunned 
absolutist interpretation. 
Three First Amendment cases have parsed the interaction of registration 
and speech. Each could offer guidance to judges and parties grappling with 
the constitutionality of gun registries. Although the analogue may not be 
seamless, a common core of both rights—as tools of political dissent—can 
sculpt these legal challenges and help courts fill the gaps left by Heller. 
A. Lamont v. Postmaster General 
In Lamont v. Postmaster General,14 the Court scrutinized a statute 
mandating that the postmaster general detain any mail deemed to be 
“communist political propaganda.”15 The government then notified the 
addressee of the mail’s detention and would destroy the mail unless the 
addressee requested delivery by returning a reply card. The Court struck 
down the Act. Justice Douglas reasoned that requiring the addressees to take 
an affirmative act as a condition of receiving speech violated the First 
Amendment. 
Significantly for our purposes, the Court censured the deterrent effect 
that the requirement would create. Certain citizens “might think they would 
invite disaster if they read what the Federal Government says contains the 
seeds of treason.”16 Thus, the Act was inimical to the First Amendment’s 
pledge to ensure “ ‘uninhibited, robust, and wide-open’ debate and 
discussion.”17 
B. Denver Area Educational Telecommunications Consortium v. FCC 
Like Lamont, Denver Area Educational Telecommunications Consortium 
v. FCC18 presented a federal statute that screened speech in a constitutionally 
suspect manner. The statute required network operators to segregate and 
block sex channels on cable television and unblock them only upon a 
 
 14. 381 U.S. 301 (1965). 
 15. Id. at 302 (quoting 39 U.S.C. § 4008(a)). 
 16. Id. at 307. 
 17. Id. (quoting N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)). 
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subscriber’s written request. The plaintiffs claimed that the law was hostile to 
their First Amendment rights. 
The Court agreed, holding that the “obvious restrictive effects” for 
viewers stemmed from the statute’s “written notice” requirement.19 
Subscribers would reasonably “fear for their reputations should the operator, 
advertently or inadvertently, disclose the list of those who wish to watch the 
‘patently offensive’ channel.”20 This fear amounted to a real First 
Amendment injury. 
C. NAACP v. Alabama 
NAACP v. Alabama21 presents a more nuanced analogy. Alabama 
sought to compel the NAACP to disclose the names and addresses of all its 
members, and the trial court held the group in contempt when it refused. 
Justice Harlan, writing for a unanimous Court, held that Alabama’s actions 
effectively suppressed the NAACP’s First Amendment rights, even though 
the state did not directly do so. 
Importantly, it is not dispositive if a government takes no express action 
to inhibit these rights; rather, “[i]n the domain of these indispensable 
liberties, . . . abridgement of such rights, even though unintended, may 
inevitably follow from varied forms of governmental action.”22 The Court 
scorned legislation that, while neutral on its face, had “the practical effect ‘of 
discouraging’ the exercise of constitutionally protected political rights.”23 
Finally, the Court stressed, the “[i]nviolability of privacy” is particularly 
indispensible to the right “where a group espouses dissident beliefs.”24 
The Court invalidated the production order because it “entail[ed] the 
likelihood of a substantial restraint.”25 Compelled disclosure of the 
membership lists—which in effect would create a government registry of 
possible dissidents—would impinge on the individuals’ right to advocate for 
their cause. And, as in Lamont and Denver, the threat may “induce members 
to withdraw from the Association and dissuade others from joining it . . . .”26 
Speech cannot function as a tool of political dissent when the specter of 
government reprisal looms in the shadows. 
 
 19. Id. at 754. 
 20. Id. (citing Lamont, 381 U.S. at 307). 
 21. 357 U.S. 449 (1958). 
 22. Id. at 461. 
 23. Id. (quoting Am. Commc’ns Ass’n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 393 (1950)). 
 24. Id. at 462. 
 25. Id. 
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III. PROTECTING THE CORE: STRICT SCRUTINY OF GUN REGISTRIES 
Courts have already begun to apply First Amendment doctrine to 
Second Amendment problems. Although Heller emphatically dispensed with 
an absolute handgun ban, it clarified that “the right secured by the Second 
Amendment is not unlimited.”27 Grasping for guidance, an array of courts 
have now employed traditional free-speech tiers of scrutiny to analyze 
regulations that burden the right to keep and bear arms.28 
Specifically, courts have gauged the rigor of their judicial review 
according to “how close the law comes to the core of the Second Amendment 
right and the severity of the law’s burden on the right.”29 This analysis 
explicitly involves “[b]orrowing from the Court’s First Amendment 
doctrine.”30 Regulations that threaten the core of the Second Amendment 
and severely burden the right trigger strict scrutiny; those that do not 
“encroach on the core”31 and impose only modest burdens are less perilous 
and therefore warrant intermediate scrutiny. 
The lessons of Lamont, Denver, and NAACP teach that laws establishing 
gun registries merit strict scrutiny. The role of guns as tools of political 
dissent lies at the core of the Second Amendment, alongside the right to self-
defense. Registry laws not only invade that core but also substantially burden 
the right. True, the burden is fairly indirect, but recourse to our First 
Amendment analogues shows that not to be dispositive. The burden is 
nonetheless “substantial” because government registries might deter gun 
ownership and undermine the right’s vigor as a bulwark against tyranny. 
The laws invalidated in Lamont and Denver compelled citizens to identify 
themselves to the government, and this condition was enough of a threat to 
effectively chill the expressive right. Similarly, the trial court’s order in 
NAACP forced the group to disclose its members’ personal information in a 
manner that effectively abridged the right to free association, even though 
the order did not directly smother that right. The worry of indirect 
suffocation is particularly acute when the law implicates dissident groups. 
These factors tip the Second Amendment scales in favor of strict scrutiny. 
Moreover, Lamont and Denver caution against viewing a burden as 
“incidental” merely because the condition is easy to fulfill as a practical 
matter. Undoubtedly, neither mailing a reply card nor submitting a written 
 
 27. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626 (2008). 
 28. E.g., Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 703 (7th Cir. 2011). 
 29. Id. (emphasis added). 
 30. Id. 
 31. Nat’l Rifle Ass’n of Am. v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives, 
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request was an unreasonably cumbersome chore. Proponents of registries 
similarly urge that filling out a gun registration form is only a mild 
inconvenience. But the more salient query is whether the effect of the 
condition threatens the right—whether it materially dilutes the right’s 
power. If it does, the burden is substantial, and strict scrutiny should apply. 
There is a certain contradiction that underlies the notion of guns as a 
protector of political liberty. Opponents of registries frame gun ownership as 
a private matter, but repelling government tyranny is a dramatically public 
act. Some might suggest, therefore, that the two positions are incompatible: 
that the right to keep guns as a tool of political dissent and the right to keep 
ownership private inevitably butt heads. Yet the very nature of the dissent 
rationale is that it functions only if the state cannot easily quash the 
dissenters. Both Mr. Lamont’s right to freely receive communist literature 
and the NAACP members’ rights to freely associate in fighting segregation 
depended on a shroud of secrecy. Anonymity is crucial to the public’s ability 
to challenge a government gone rogue. This narrative might seem 
melodramatic, but if the political-dissent core is to mean anything, it must 
entertain the improbable. 
Although strict scrutiny is often called “strict in theory, but fatal in 
fact,”32 those in favor of registries need not despair. Public safety can clearly 
be a compelling governmental interest.33 What strict scrutiny ensures, 
though, is that the government actually demonstrates the connection 
between registration and safety and that it narrowly tailors the registration 
law to serve that interest. There is no use speculating as to how these scales 
would ultimately tip—it is impossible to conduct a true means–ends analysis 
on an imaginary law—but the analogies in this Essay should provide 
guidance to both drafters and challengers. Ultimately, though, the analogy 
cannot carry this issue all the way over the finish line: the question remains 
as to whether registration is the kind of “longstanding” regulation preserved 
by Heller.34 That complex inquiry deserves its own Essay and must wait for 
another day. 
CONCLUSION 
If we take seriously the role of guns as tools of political dissent, 
registration laws must first survive the rigors of close judicial scrutiny. The 
 
 32. Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term – Foreword: In Search of Evolving 
Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 
(1972). Many have disputed whether it is truly “fatal in fact.” E.g., Adam Winkler, Fatal in 
Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis of Strict Scrutiny in the Federal Courts, 59 
VAND. L. REV. 793 (2006). 
 33. E.g., United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987). 
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right’s liberty-protecting role lies at the core of the Second Amendment, 
envisioned by the Framers and enshrined in the Constitution. By looking at 
the Court’s treatment of one fundamental right, we see how the absence of 
anonymity may create a severe burden on another. The fears entangled with 
registration could deter gun ownership and undermine the right’s strength 
as a fortress against tyranny. 
The conclusions reached in this Essay have at times been tough to 
stomach.35 It is unpleasant to discover common ground with those who 
equate proponents of gun control with the perpetrator of the Holocaust. 
These inflammatory comparisons are unhelpful—they distract from the 
more temperate support that history provides. For many, though, gun 
registries are the least we can do to prevent crime and avoid senseless 
bloodshed. The epidemic of gun violence in America could easily tempt us to 
adopt a cavalier attitude toward the Second Amendment. But the protections 
embedded in the Constitution and the Court’s guidance in analogous First 
Amendment cases compelled my conclusions. As Justice Scalia proclaimed 
in Heller, “the enshrinement of constitutional rights necessarily takes certain 
policy choices off the table.”36 Gun registries may well be one such choice 
that we simply cannot make. 
 
 
 35. I am not the first to feel discomfort after diving into the Second Amendment. Before 
Heller, a wave of liberal law professors began to advocate for a broad reading of the individual 
right to keep and bear arms. “My conclusion came as something of a surprise to me, and an 
unwelcome surprise,” reported Professor Tribe. “I have always supported as a matter of policy 
very comprehensive gun control.” Adam Liptak, A Liberal Case for Gun Rights Sways Judiciary, 
N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 2007, at A18, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/06/us/06firearms.html?pagewanted=all&_r=1&. 
 36. Heller, 554 U.S. at 636. 
